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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF ALBANY
In the Matter of the Application of
Index No.

Petitioner,
For a judgment pursuant to Alticle 78 of the Civil
Practice Law and Rules,

Judge:

-againstTINA M. STANFORD, Chai1woman of the New
York State Board of Parole
Respondent.

VERIFIED PETITION PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 78
, by his undersigned attorneys, for his petition against

Petitioner
respondent, alleges as follows:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1.

Petitioner

, a 64-year-old man who has been incarcerated for

over 30 years-nearly half his life-brings this Alticle 78 petition to vacate the September 2020
decision of the New York State Board of Parole (the " Parole Board" or the "Board") denying
him release on parole. Under governing law, the Board's decision was deficient as a matter of

's

law: it was conclusory, vague, and failed to meaningfully address aspects of Mr.
record that the Board's own regulations require it to consider. Significantly, in making its

decision, the Board focused exclusively on the details of the offense giving rise to the instant
prison sentence and other unproven conduct predating that offense, and in doing so effectively
resentenced Mr.

in violation of state law. Indeed, the Board's denial violates New

York law and regulations . Since the Board's perfunct01y denial of Mr.
parole failed to meaningfully assess evidence demonstrating Mr.
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's rehabilitation and
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his suitability for release and reentry into society, this Court should vacate the Board's decision
and order a properly conducted de novo parole release hearing.

VENUE
2.

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to CPLR § § 506(b) and 7804(b) because

Albany County is the comity in which the parole detennination was affinned on administrative
appeal, and is also the county in which the Respondent Tina M. Stanford has her principal office.

An Aliicle 78 petition may be filed in "any county within the judicial district where the
respondent made the determination complained of." CPLR § 506(b) and§ 7804(b).

FACTS

I.

'S REHABILITATION AND READINESS FOR RELEASE

MR.
3.

Mr.

is a 64-year-old man who has spent more than 30 yearn in prison.

On March 8, 1991, Mr.

was sentenced to an indeterminate prison te1m of25 years to

life aft.er being convicted of second-degree murder and petit larceny. Rudofsky Aff., Ex. A at 23. He has served over 30 year s of his sentence, and is cmTently incarcerated and under the
supervision of the Department of Co1Tections and Community Supervision at Bare Hill
C01Tectional Facility ("Bare Hill").
4.
matmity, and rehabilitation, as reflected by the Board of Parole's own risk assessment tool. See
Rudofsky Aff., Ex. B. In over 30 years of imprisonment, Mr.

has only received one

Tier II disciplinaiy infraction, which was the result of a misunderstanding. Rudofsky Aff., Ex. C
at 6, 11. While incai·cerated, Mr.

has also successfully completed a number of

educational and self-improvement programs. He obtained his GED, and completed the required
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programs ART (Aggression Replacement Training), AVP (Alternative Violence), and Phase II.
Rudofsky Aff., Ex.Cat 6, 36-38.
5.

Mr.

's record during his incarceration shows that not only has he

achieved impressive personal growth, but he has helped other inmates and been a p ositive
influence on others in the various facilities in which he has been incarcerated. For example, for
over 20 years, Mr.

has se1ved as a football coach for other inmates. In doing so, he has

helped bring together men who were pa.it of different gangs to successfully play for the same
team and attain a positive outlook. Rudofsky Aff. , Ex.Cat 5, 12, 14, 46-47. Mr.

has

received letters from f01mer players thanking him for his se1vice, and as far as he is aware, all of
the men he coached have been successful after release. Rudofsky Aff., Ex. C at 5.
6.

Mr.

has also worked as a Jewish Facilitator for many years at various

facilities. Rudofsky Aff., Ex.Cat 5-6, 12-13. His responsibilities in this role have included
organizing and leading prayer, se1vices and study groups; planning holidays and celebrations;
and perfo1ming other suppo1tive tasks. Rudofsky Aff., Ex.Cat 5. Although Mr.

is not

Jewish himself, se1ving as a Jewish Facilitator has helped him bring together people of different
faiths and beliefs, and has allowed him to mentor other men. Rudofsky Aff., Ex.Cat 6. For
example, he was able to mentor . . . . . . who Mr.
se1vices. Rudofsky Aff., Ex.Cat 6.

first met during religious

Mr. 1111111 submitted a letter to the Board in supp01t of Mr.

's parole application, stating, "Our relationship started as a religious suppo1t system and
our friendship grew from there .... [Mr.

speaks with Mr.

....

has had a great impact on me. He is a great

"two times per week, not counting letters. " Rudofsky Aff., Ex.Cat

21.
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7.

Mr.

has also worked in the gardens of various facilities, including at

Bare Hill. Rudofsky Aff. , Ex.Cat 6. BaTe Hill 's Garden Supervisor
letter to the Board, stating, "Mr.

's knowledge and experience in vegetable gardening

and greenhouse management was an asset to the program. Mr.
productive in this assignment. Mr.

submitted a

was timely and

displayed a positive and respectful attitude toward

Staff members and inmate pa1ticipants." Rudofsky Aff., Ex. C at 45.
8.

Additionally, Mr.

has been able to develop a significant suppo1t system

that would be in place upon his release. Impo1tantly, he has been able to secure guaranteed

York, where . . . . aunt has offered her home to him. Rudofsky Aff., Ex. Cat 21. Mr.
also has guaranteed paid employment as a Recovery Peer Advocate with the Rochester
Community Outreach and Recovery Enhancement Center, which will offer him additional skills
and training and connections to other community agencies. Rudofsky Aff. , Ex.Cat 28. If the
transfer to Rochester is denied, Mr.

intends to return to Jefferson County, and has

received a letter of assurance from the Wate1town Urban Mission, which will likewise be able to
provide him with suppo1t. Rudofsky Aff. , Ex. Cat 34.
9.

's most recent COMPAS rep01t- an objective

Based on these facts, Mr.

measure used by the New York Department of Co1Tections an d Community Supervision to
assess the risk associated with prospective parolees-co1Tectly determined that, overall, Mr.
is at low risk of re-offense. In pa1ticular, the July 2020 COMPAS report scored Mr.
as having low risk for felony violence, a1Test, absconding, criminal involvement,
history of violence, and prison misconduct. Rudofsky Aff., Ex.Bat 1. The Report also scored

-4-
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him as having low risk for negative social cognitions, low self-efficacy/optimism , financial
issues upon reentry, and employment issues upon reentry. Rudofsky Aff. , Ex. B at 1.
10.

Although Mr.

received higher scores for risk of substance abuse upon

reentry and low family support, these scores are contradicted by documents in the record, and the
Board e1Ted in relying on them. In pru.1icular, although the most recent COMPAS repo1t scored
as "probable" for reentry substance abuse, Rudofsky Aff., Ex.Bat 1, numerous

Mr.

documents demonstrate that Mr.

has never had a substance abuse problem, and has no

such problems now. In 2016, for instance, the Treatment Plan Review Committee assessed Mr.
and found that he did not require Alcohol and Substance Abuse Treatment (ASAT)
because "no evidence suggest[s] a clinical diagnosis for a substance use disorder." Rudofsky
was given

Aff., Ex.Cat 58. In his prior COM.PAS repo1ts from 2016 and 2018, Mr.

the lowest score of 1 for risk of reentry substance abuse because, among other things, he did not
undergo "any prior treatments for chug/alcohol abuse and did not indicate any history of failed
ch11g/UA tests." Rudofsky Aff., Ex. D at 1; Ex.Eat 1, 4. And in his case plans from May 2018
through November 2019, Mr.

's counselors consistently indicated that he had no need

for a substance abuse program. Rudofsky Aff., Ex. Fat 3, 6, 12, 17, 22. In over three decades of
incai·ceration, Mr.

has not received any disciplinaiy infractions concerning substance

abuse, nor has he tested positive for any chugs. There is, therefore, no basis for the most recent
COM.PAS report's score of "probable" for risk of reentry substance abuse.
11.

The most recent COMPAS rep01t also scored Mr.

as "highly probable"

for low family support, noting that "[i]t is unce1tain as to whether there is evidence of family

--

suppo1t letter to the Boai·d in August 2020, stating, "I have known -5-
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communicated by phone or letters through the years.... I want to support him emotionally
however I can." Rudofsky Aff, Ex.Cat 18. This letter demonstrates that Mr.

indeed

has family suppo1t on which he can rely upon his release, contra1y to the assessment th at it is
"unce1tain as to whether there is evidence of family suppo1t." Rudofsky Aff., Ex. B at 11.
II.

'S PARO LE BOARD H EARING

MR.
12.

On September 29, 2020, Mr.

appeared before Commissioners Drake and

Mitchell via video conference at Bare Hill. This was Mr.
th e hearing, Mr.

's fomih parole hearing. At

expressed that he is not proud of his past or the person he was 30

years ago. Rudofsky Aff. , Ex. G at 35. With respect to the offense for which he was convicted,
he added that- while he maintains his innocence-he thinks about the victim's family all the
time, including her mother and son for whom he has great empathy. Rudofsky Aff., Ex. G at 36.
The Board acknowledged that Mr.

got "ve1y emotional" while speaking about the

victim's family. Rudofsky Aff., Ex. G at 3

ined his efforts to improve

himself through educational and vocational programming. Rudofsky Aff. , Ex. G at 28, 31, 33.
13.

Additionally, in advance of the hearing, Iv.Ir.

submitted a packet of

parole application materials. This packet includes an advocacy letter from the Parole Preparation
Project, Mr.

's personal statement, eight letters of suppo1t from friends and family, six

letters of reasonable assurance that he will have employment and housing if released, evidence of
programmatic achievements, evidence of volunteer achievements, Mr.
records and resume, and evidence suppo1ting Mr.

's conections

's claim of innocence of the crime

giving rise to his immediate sentence. Rudofsky Aff. , Ex. C.
14.

Despite this impressive record justifying parole, on the very same day as the

hearing, the Collllllissioners summarily denied parole and ordered Mr.
-6-
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additional 24 months. Rudofsky Aff, Ex. G. Dming the hearing and in their fo1mulaic and
conclusory order denying parole, the Commissioners focused almost entirely on the crime giving
' s immediate sentence and his pmported criminal history, much of which is

rise to Mr.

contradicted by the record. They failed to consider Mr.

's rehabilitation and release

plan in any meaningful way. Nor did they explain why they depaited from M
COMPAS scores. Rather, the Board resorted to boile1plate language as it listed off the statuto1y
factors that it must-and that it claims it did-consider, without providing any analysis or
explanation whatsoever as to how those factors affected its decision. Rudofsky Aff., Ex. G.

III.
15.

Mr.

timely submitted his Notice of Appeal of the Board's September 29,

2020 decision, and submitted a timely administrative appeal of the Boai·d's order to the Appeals
Unit of the Boai·d of Parole on Febrnaiy 23, 2021. Rudofsky Aff, Ex. H. On June 10, 2021 , the
Board affnmed the denial of parole, and served the denial on Mr.

on June 15, 2021.

this matter is ripe for the instant Alticle 78 proceeding. Additionally, the instant petition is
properly filed within the applicable four-month statute of limitations. See CPLR § 217(1 ).

CAUSES OF ACTION

I.

FAILURE TO PROVIDE AN INDIVIDUALIZED AND NON-CONCLUSORY
EXPLANATION FOR DENYING PAROLE
16.

Petitioner repeats and realleges each and every allegation previously set fo1th in

this petition in pai·agraphs 1 through 15.

-7-
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17.

The Board's regulations require the Board to give an individualized, detailed non-

conclusory explanation for the reasons for the denial of parole release that addresses how the
applicable parole factors were considered. 9 NYCRR 8002.3.
18.

The Board failed to do so, instead providing brief, conclusory explanations for

denying parole that do not explain why release would be incompatible with the safety of the
community or undermine respect for the law.
19.

These conclusory explanations also fail to meaningfully engage with the totality
's record-which includes a low COMPAS score, a strong institutional record

ofMr.

leading up to his parole hearing, and a comprehensive release plan-and do not explain why
those positive aspects of Mr.

's record are outweighed by the negative aspects of his

record.
20.

The Board's explanations improperly emphasize past behavior, all of which was

before the sentencing court when it set the minimum sentence already served by Mr.
The Board did so despite the fact that the relevant inquity for parole involves Mr.

's

present risk to society if released.
21.

Since the Board's decision is contrary to the relevant law, it is arbitrary and

capricious and merits vacatur.

II.

FAILURE TO MEANINGFULLY CONSIDER ALL RELEVANT STATUTORY
FACTORS
22.

Petitioner repeats and realleges each and every allegation previously set fo1ih in

this petition in paragraphs 1 through 21.
23.

N.Y. Exec. Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A) requit·es the Board to consider eight factors

when making a parole decision, but the Board exclusively focused on the circumstances of the
-8-
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offense for which Mr.

is now incarcerated. This failure to consider or rationally weigh

the remaining statuto1y factors violates New York state law. King v. NY State Div. ofParole,
190 A.D.2d 423 (1st Dep 't 1993), aff'd, 632 N.E.2d 1277 (N.Y. 1994).
24.

Moreover, the Board's singular focus on facts that Mr.

cannot change-

to the exclusion of evidence demonstrating his institutional achievements, rehabilitation, and
plans for release- violates New York law as the Board cannot deny release based solely on the
nature of the underlying offense. Rios v. NY State Div. ofParole, 2007 WL 846561 (Sup. Ct.,
Kings Cnty. 2007).
25.

The Board's rote recitation of the factors it should have considered, without any

evidence that it did in fact consider those factors, is insufficient to meet its obligation under New
York state law.
26.

Since the Board's decision is contrary to the relevant law, it is arbitrary and

capricious and should be vacated.

III.

FAILURE TO JUSTIFY DEPARTURE FROM THE COMPAS ASSESSMENT
SCORE
27.

Petitioner repeats and realleges each and every allegation previously set forth in

this petition in paragraphs 1 through 26.
28.

Under Board regulations, "[i]f a Boai-d detennination, denying release, departs

from the Department Risk and Needs Assessment's scores, the Board shall specify any scale
within the Depa1tment Risk and Needs Assessment from which it depaited and provide an
individualized reason for such depaiture." 9 NYCRR 8002.2(a).
29.

The Board failed to comply with its regulations in this case. While the Boai·d

acknowledged Mr.

's "COMPAS risk assessment and the low scores indicated therein,
-9-
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with the exception of highly probable for low family suppoti," it neve1iheless concluded that Mr.
's release "would be incompatible with the welfare of society." Rudofsky Aff., Ex. G
at 37-38. It did so without providing any reason for depaiting from the COMPAS results finding
that he had low risk of felony violence, arrest, absconding, criminal involvement, hist01y of
violence, and prison misconduct. Rudofsky Aff., Ex. B.
30.

The Board did not specify the paiiicular COMPAS scales from which it was

choosing to depai·t, and did not explain, in ai1 individualized mailller, why specific aspects of Mr.
's record wananted depaiture from any of the COMPAS scales.
31.

Since the Boai·d failed to comply with its regulations in depai·ting from Mr.

's COMPAS assessment, vacatur is wananted.
IV.

UNLAWFUL RESENTENCING BY FOCUSING EXCLUSIVELY ON MR.
'S BEHAVIOR 30 YEARS AGO AND RELYING ON EVIDENCE
OF UNPROVEN CONDUCT
32.

Petitioner repeats and realleges each and every allegation previously set forth in

this petition in paragraphs 1 through 31.
33.

In denying Mr.

offense--for which Mr.

's application for parole on the basis of the instant
's sentencing comt detennined merited a minimum sentence of

25 years- the Board effectively concluded that the judicially-imposed minimum sentence is
insufficient. In so doing, the Board was "in effect, re-sentencing petitioner to a sentence that
excluded any possibility of parole since petitioner is powerless to change his past conduct."

Rios, 2007 WL 846561, at *4. " [A]s the Appellate Division has admonished, under similai·
circumstances, such 're-sentencing' by the Parole Board 'reveal[s] a fundamental
misunderstanding of the limitations of administrative power."' Id. (citing King, 190 A.D .2d at
432).
-10-
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34.

The conduct on which the Board focused- the circumstances of the instant crime

and his past criminal hist01y- was properly before Mr.
opportunity to review Mr.

's sentencing judge, who had an

's record and those facts when imposing a sentence. The

Board's rejection of the sentencing judge's dete1mination that a minimum sentence of 25 years
was appropriate in light of the factors the Board now says compel Mr.

's continued

incai·ceration is contra1y to law.
35.

Moreover, in addition to focusing almost entirely on the conduct that was before
's sentencing judge, the Board relied heavily on Mr.

Mr.

's purported criminal

histo1y, including behavior that has not been proven. Among other things, the Board asked
numerous questions at the hearing about 1979 charges of sexual abuse in the first degree, rape in
the first degree, unlawful imprisonment, and criminal mischief; 1988 charges ofrape in the third
degree, two counts of endangering the welfare of a child, and six counts of sexual abuse in the
third degree; and a 1987 domestic violence allegation against Mr.
G at 20:9-12, 21:12-15, 25:17-20. As shown by Mr.

. Rudofsky Aff., Ex.

's criminal record, however, Mr.

was cleared of those charges and has never been convicted of those offenses.
Rudofsky Aff., Ex. A. The Board improperly considered these chai·ges and allegations.

Williams v. Travis, 20 A.D. 3d 622, 623 (3d Dep' t 2005).
36.

By relying on unproven conduct to deny pai·ole, the Board effectively tried,

convicted, and sentenced Mr.

for decades-old allegations for which he was never

convicted. This effective resentencing is contra1y to law and merits vacatur.

- 11-

11 of 15

FUSL000149

V.

UNLAWFUL RELIANCE ON INACCURATE ASSESSMENTS AND
INFORMATION
37.

Petitioner repeats and realleges each and every allegation previously set f01th in

this petition in parngraphs 1 through 36.
38.

The Board relied on inaccurate assessments and info1mation in making its
eleased on parole. hi paiticular, the

Board appears to have relied on eIToneous assessments in Mr.

's othe1wise favorable

COMP AS report concerning his risk of substance abuse and low family support.
39.

Despite there being no evidence in the record that Mr.

has~r ever

had-any substance abuse issues, the most recent COMPAS report inexplicably scored him as
"probable" for the risk of substance abuse upon reentry. Rudofsky Aff. , Ex. B at 1. The Boai·d
acknowledged at the heai·ing that Mr.

does not have any dmg-related problems, yet it

failed to cleai·ly and expressly acknowledge that the COMPAS repo1t' s assessment of Mr.
's risk of substance abuse upon reently was erroneous.
40.

hi contrast, the Board explicitly relied on the COMPAS rep01t' s inaccurate

assessment of "highly probable" for low family suppo1t when making its decision. The "highly
probable" score is contradicted by evidence in Mr.

41.

--

's file-namely, a letter of support

The Boai·d should not have relied on these inaccurate assessments-which ai·e

contt·adicted by other facts in the record-and its doing so merits vacatur.
42.

Fmther, the Board eIToneously found that Mr.

failed to show any

remorse-and could not show any remorse-because he maintains his innocence with respect to
the underlying offense. The parole hearing transcript, however, belies this finding.
-12-
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43.
Mr.

Although he maintains his innocence for the crime for which he was convicted,
nonetheless expressed deep remorse and empathy at the hearing, including for the

victim's family. Rudofsky Aff., Ex. G at 36:4-11. He also expressed remorse and sonow for
ce1tain actions that he took in the past, over 30 years ago. Rudofsky Aff., Ex. G at 35:4-36:4.
Where an applicant shows insight and remorse for the victim and the victim's family, as here, the
Board cannot base its decision on a lack of remorse. See Winchell v. Evans, 27 Misc.3d 1232(A)
(Sup. Ct., Sullivan Cnty. 2010).
44.

The Board's reliance on a finding that Mr.

lacked remorse was improper

and merits vacatur.

VI.

FAILURE TO CONSIDER REENTRY PLANS
45.

Petitioner repeats and realleges each and every allegation previously set forth in

this petition in paragraphs 1 through 44.
46.

The Board's governing statute explicitly requires the Board to consider "release

plans including community resources, employment, education and training and suppo11 services
available to the inmate" in making a release decision. N.Y. Exec. Law§ 259-i(c)(A)(iii).
47.

There is no indication that the Board actually considered Mr.

's reentry

plan-which included documented suppo1t from friends and family members, as well as a plan
for housing and employment if released, Rudofsky Aff., Ex. C at 17-26, 28-30-in rendering its
decision. Since the Board failed to consider a statutorily-required factor, the denial was arbitraiy
and capricious and must be vacated.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court enter an order:
1. Annulling the decision of Respondent, dated September 29, 2020, denying

-13-
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2. Directing Respondent to immediately release Petitioner on parole or afford Mr.
a new, de novo parole release hearing before a new panel that does not
include any commissioner who has previously denied Mr.

release, at

which Respondent shall consider all appropriate statuto1y factors governing
parole release determinations; and,
3. Granting such additional relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: October 8, 2021
New York, New York

Respectfully submitted,

By:

())-Joshua Goldberg
Ariel Rudofsky
Attorneys for Petitioner
PATTERSON BELKNAP WEBB &
TYLERLLP
1133 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036
Tel.: 212-336-2000
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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF ALBANY

Index No.

Petitioner,
For a judgment pursuant to Alticle 78 of the Civil
Practice Law and Rules,

Judge:

-againstTINA M. STANFORD, Chai1woman of the New
York State Board of Parole
Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO
ARTICLE 78 OF THE NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES

Joshua Goldberg
Aliel Rudofsky
Attorneys for Petitioner
PATTERSON BELKNAP WEBB &
TYLERLLP
1133 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036
Tel.: 212-336-2000
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
brings this action pursuant to Atiicle 78 of the New York

Petitioner

Civil Practice Law and Rules to vacate the September 2020 decision of the New York State
Board of Parole (the "Parole Board" or the "Board") denying him release on parole. -

a 64-year-old man, has been incarcerated for nearly half his life, and has akeady

served a lengthy term of incarceration for the underlying offense. Mr. -

is not the same

man who was sentenced decades ago to a prison tenn of 25 yearn to life. Over the past three
decades of imprisonment, Mr. -

has developed an impressive record of rehabilitative

accomplishment. He has obtained his GED and completed required self-improvement programs.
He has successfully served in volunteer roles as a football coach, Jewish Facilitator, and gardener
at the various facilities in which he has been incarcerated, mentoring and having a positive
impact on his fellow inmates through such roles. He has fostered relationships and established a
significant suppo1t system for after his release, including by securing guaranteed housing and
growth, maturity, and rehabilitation are reflected by,

paid employment. Indeed, Mr. -

among other things, the Board's own risk assessment tool finding Mr. -

an overall low

risk, including for felony violence, an-est, and absconding. Nonetheless, on September 29, 2020,
the Board denied Mr. entirely on the offense Mr. -

parole in a curso1y order. The Parole Board focused almost
was convicted of three decades ago, rather than the many

statuto1y factors that merit his release today. In doing so, the Parole Board ran afoul of statuto1y
and constitutional law.
The Board's decision was contraiy to law, arbitraiy, and capricious for several reasons.
First, the Boai·d failed to provide Mr. -

with the individualized and non-conclusory

explanation for his parole denial that New York law requires. It instead issued a boilerplate
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decision completely lacking in individualized analysis. Second, the Board failed to meaningfully
address the factors it must consider and, instead, focused exclusively on the crime underlying his
incarceration. Third, the Board failed to justify its departure from its own risk assessment tool.
Fomih, the Board substituted its judgment as to the appropriate sentence for the offense for that
of the sentencing comt and improperly relied on alleged conduct for which Mr. -

was

never convicted as a basis for denying him parole. Fifth, the Board unlawfully relied on
inaccmate infonnation and assessments in making its determination. And finally, the Board
failed to meaningfully consider Mr. -

well-documented reentry plans. Each and every

one of these errors merits vacatur, so that Mr. -

can appear before a Parole Board that

will comply with its legal obligations.
FACTS

Petitioner refers the Court to the facts set fo1th in his Verified Petition for Relief Pursuant
to Alticle 78.
ARGUMENT

Under Alticle 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, this Comt may vacate a
decision of the New York State Board of Parole when it is "made in violation of lawful
procedme, was affected by an eITor of law or was arbitraiy and capricious or an abuse of
discretion." N.Y. CPLR § 7803(3). Upon such a showing, "[t]he proper remedy is ... a new
hearing" before the Board. Kellogg v. N. Y. State Bd. ofParole, 159 A.D.3d 439, 442 (1st Dep't
2018). Because the Board's decision was contrary to law, arbitrary, and capricious, it must be
vacated.

-

-26 of 27

FUSL000149

I.

THE BOARD'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE AN INDIVIDUALIZED AND NONCONCLUSORY EXPLANATION FOR DENYING PAROLE VIOLATED
LAWFUL PROCEDURE
New York law directs the Board to grant parole if "there is a reasonable probability that,

if such inmate is released, he will live an d remain at libe1ty without violating the law, and that
his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the
seriousness of his crime as to undennine respect for law." N.Y. Exec. Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A). If
parole is denied, the Board must explain the reasons for denial " in detail and not in concluso1y
te1ms." N.Y. Exec. Law. § 259-i(2)(a). Under its own regulations, moreover, the Board must
"address how the applicable parole decision-making principles and factors . . . were considered
in the individual's case." 9 NYCRR 8002.3. In Mr. -

case, however, the Board failed

to comply with this standard.
The Board denied parole to Mr. -

because it concluded that "release would be

incompatible with the welfare of society and would so deprecate the serious nature of (Mr.
-

crime as to unde1mine respect for the law," and that, if released, "there is a

reasonable probability that (Mr. -

would not live and remain at libe1ty again without

violating the law." Rudofsky Aff., Ex. G at 37. In denying Mr. apparently relied on the nature of Mr. -

parole, the Board

offense of conviction, that his criminal hist01y

purpo1tedly "reflects an escalation of criminal behavior, which [he] continually minimize[s],"
and the fact that Mr. -

maintains his innocence for the instant offense, which the Board

concluded means that "there could have been no remorse for the crime for which [he was]
convicted and the family involved." Id. at 37-38. These explanations, alone, do not explain why

Mr. -

release would be incompatible with the safety of the community or unde1mine

respect for the law. See V. Sullivan v. NY. State Bd ofParole, 100865/ 18, slip op. at 9 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. Cnty. 2019) (ordering a de novo hearing and faulting Board for stating conclusions that
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merely "track[ed] the statuto1y language, without explanation or context"). Nor do they explain
why there is any reasonable basis for the Parole Board to conclude that Mr. -

would

violate the law if released.
These conclusory explanations also fail to meaningfully consider the totality of Mr.
-

record, which includes a lengthy record of accomplishments within prison, a low

COMPAS score, a comprehensive release plan, and numerous letters of suppo1t attesting to his
positive character. Indeed, Mr. -

has a strong institutional record of accomplishment.

While incarcerated, he has earned his GED and completed several self-improvement programs,
including ART (Aggression Replacement Training), AVP (Alternative Violence), and Phase II.
Rudofsky Aff., Ex.Cat 6, 36-38. As discussed more below, he has served as a football coach,
Jewish Facilitator, and gardener at various facilities, with praise from many for his commitment
and support in each of these roles. Mr. -

file contains numerous letters of suppo1i from

friends and family members, including many individuals who have been positively impacted by
him prior to their own release from prison. Id. at 17-26. Mr. -

COMPAS repo1t shows

that he is at low risk of re-offense. Rudofsky Aff., Ex. B. Throughout the past three decades of
imprisonment, Mr. -

has only received one Tier II disciplinaiy infraction, which was the

result of a misunderstanding. Rudofsky Aff., Ex. C at 6, 11. And Mr. -

has a well-

documented plan for housing and employment following his release. Rudofsky Aff., Ex.Cat 17,
28-30.
Describing the Board' s engagement with this record as "cursory" is an understatement.
In fact, the Boai·d did not meaningfully address any of this evidence. The Board merely "noted"
Mr. -

"disciplinaiy record and the single disciplina1y infraction," as well as his

"program participation to date and the completion of required programs." Rudofsky Aff., Ex. G

-
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at 38. It asse1ted ftnther that it had "weighed and considered the results of [Mr. COMPAS risk assessment and the low scores indicated therein, with the exception of highly
probable for low family suppoit." Id. Without any reasoning or elaboration whatsoever, the
Board also stated in a single sentence that it had "reviewed and considered" Mr. "well-documented release plan and suppo1t letters included therein." Id. In reality, however, the
Board did not address any of this evidence in any detail or weigh the evidence in reaching its
decision. Rather, it summarily concluded that "discretionaiy release at this time is not
appropriate" based on "all required factors in the file considered. " Id.
The Board's rote recitation of the relevant standard an d boilerplate lan guage fall far
shoI1 of what is required to substai1tiate a denial of parole. See, e.g. , Rossakis v. NY. State Bd. of
Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22, 28 (1st Dep't 2016) (holding the Parole Board violated the statut01y

requirement that the reasons for denial not be concluso1y when it "summarily listed petitioner' s
institutional achievements and then denied parole with no ftnther analysis of them"). Notably,
the Board's written decision here failed to provide a basis to dete1mine how the statuto1y factors
were weighed and why release was not wananted-deficiencies meriting vacatur. See, e.g.,
Platten v. NY. State Bd. ofParole, 47 Misc. 3d 1059, 1064 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cnty. 2015)

("Based on the record and the lack of specificity in the decision, the cowt cannot dete1mine what
concern the Boai·d had for the public safety and welfai·e, and why it had that concern at the time
of the inte1view[.]"); Morris v. NY. State Dep 't of Corr. & Crnty. Supervision, 40 Misc. 3d 226,
235 (Sup. Ct. Columbia Cnty. 2013) ("[T]he BoaTd failed to explain, other than the facts of the
crime, why petitioner's release was 'incompatible with the public safety and welfare' and why
there was 'a reasonable probability [he] would not live and remain at liberty without violating
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the law.' ... [T]he Board 'should be well able to a1ticulate the reasoning' for its decision, ' if it
were come to reasonably, in a non-arbitrary, un-capricious manner. "').
By failing to provide any analysis of the favorable factors in the record, the Board
likewise failed to explain how the facts that existed more than three decades ago outweigh the
substantial evidence demonstrating that Mr. -

would be able to lead a crime-free and

productive life now if released. Comts have vacated parole denials on exactly this type of failme
to explain how the Board has weighed the statuto1y factors. See, e.g., McBride v. Evans, 2014
WL 815247, at *3 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty. 2014) ("While the Board discussed petitioner's
positive activities and accomplishments at the hearing, it then concluded that his release was
incompatible with 'public safety and welfare.' The Board gave no analysis as to how or why it
reached this conclusion. It appears to have focused only on petitioner's past behavior without
aiticulating a rational basis for reaching its conclusion that his release would be incompatible
with the welfare of society at this time."); V Sullivan, 100865/18, slip op. at 10 ("[T]here is no
explanation why the 25 yeai· old crime outweighed the voluminous evidence that indicates
petitioner would presently be able to lead a quiet and crime-free life in society."); Weinstein v.

Dennison, 2005 WL 856006, at *7 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2005) ("[T]he Board is required to do
more than merely mouth the statuto1y criteria, paiticularly where as [sic] here each factor recited
and brought fo1th in the parole interview, other than the crime itself, Inilitated in favor of
release.").
Fmther, without a sufficiently detailed explanation of its detennination denying parole,
and of how the Board considered the statutory factors in his case, Mr. -

is completely

lmable to prepare for futme pai·ole heai·ings. See Greene v. Smith, 52 A.D.2d 292, 294 (4th
Dep't 1976) (explaining that "[t]he objective in requiring the board to furnish reasons is to guide
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and to aid the prisoner in his endeavor to return to society as a useful citizen"). This ha1m is
especially acute because this was Mr. -

fomth denial. See Rudofsky Aff., Ex. J. And,

the instant denial contained no recommendations for what Mr. -

could do to be paroled

in the future. Given that the Board' s decision appears to be entirely based on the past~n things
that cannot be changed-it is impossible to know what Mr. -

can do in the future to

demonstrate that he is ready to be released into society. fudeed, the only inference that can be
drawn from this record is that the Board will never meaningfully evaluate the full set of relevant
considerations in detennining whether Mr. -

should be released, thereby converting his

indete1minate sentence into a mandatory life sentence.
The Board's failure to provide the requisite individualized consideration and explanation
merits granting Mr. -

II.

petition.

THE BOARD'S FAILURE TO MEANINGFULLY CONSIDER ALL RELEVANT
STATUTORY FACTORS VIOLATED LAWFUL PROCEDURE
To assess whether an incarcerated individual is likely to recidivise, and whether release

is compatible with the welfare of society so as not to depreciate the seriousness of the crime, the
Board is statutorily directed to consider eight factors:
(i) the institutional record including program goals and accomplishments,
academic achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments,
therapy and interactions with staff and inmates;
(ii) perfo1mance, if any, as a paiticipant in a temporaiy release program;
(iii) release plans including community resources, employment, education and
training and support services available to the inmate;
(iv) any depo1tation order issued by the federal government against the inmate
while in the custody of the depaitment and any recommendation regarding
depo1iation made by the commissioner of the department pursuant to section
one hundred fo1ty-seven of the conection law;
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(v) any cmTent or prior statement made to the board by the crime victim or the
victim's representative, where the crime victim is deceased or is mentally or
physically incapacitated;
(vi) the length of the dete1minate sentence to which the imnate would be subject
had he or she received a sentence pursuant to section 70.70 or section 70.71 of
the penal law for a felony defined in ai1icle two hundred twenty or a1ticle two
hundred twenty-one of the penal law;
(vii) the seriousness of the offense with due consideration to the type of
sentence, length of sentence and recommendations of the sentencing com1, the
district attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the pre-sentence probation repo1t as
well as consideration of any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities
following an est prior to confinement; and
(viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and pattern of offenses,
adjustment to any previous probation or parole supervision ai1d institutional
confinement.
N.Y. Exec. Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A).
It is settled law that the enumeration of these factors means that the Board cannot deny
release based solely on the nature of the underlying offense. See, e.g. , Mitchell v. N. Y. State Div.

ofParole, 58 A.D.3d 742, 743 (2d Dep't 2009) (affuming grant of Alticle 78 petition where
parole board "failed to take other relevant statuto1y factors into account" even though the
"seriousness of the underlying offense [was] acutely relevant in detennining whether the
petitioner should be released on parole"); Ferrante v. Stanford, 172 A.D.3d 31 , 37 (2d Dep' t
2019) ("[T]he Board may not deny an imnate pai·ole based solely on the seriousness of the
offense[.]"); Freidgood v. N. Y. State Bd. OfParole, 22 A.D.3d 950, 951 (3d Dep't 2005)
(concluding that a parole denial that ignored factors such as the petitioner's expressions of
remorse and disciplinary record on the basis that petitioner's offense was violent was "iITational
under the cii·cumstances as to border on impropriety."); see also Rios v. N. Y. State Div. ofParole,
2007 WL 846561, at *5 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2007) ("[I]n affording the possibility of parole to
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those convicted of murder, the legislature has made a dete1mination that, despite the seriousness
of that crime, rehabilitation is possible and desirable.").
Where the parole decision is based exclusively on the seriousness of the offense, and the
parole denial was thus "a foregone conclusion," reversal is wairnnted. See Johnson v. NY Bd. of

Parole, 65 A.D.3d 838, 839 (4th Dep 't 2009); see also Morris, 40 Misc.3d at 233 ("When, as
here, the Parole Boai·d focuses entirely on the nature of petitioner's crime, there is a strong
indication that the denial of pai·ole is a foregone conclusion that does not comport with statuto1y
requirements."); Pulinario v. NY State Dep 't of Corr. & C,nty. Supervision, 2014 WL 886955,
at *4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2014) ("[T]he Pai·ole Board's ove1whehning emphasis was on the
offense .... At the heai·ing, there were only passing references to the contents of petitioner' s
application. fu the decision there was only a perfuncto1y mention of all the statuto1y factors that
weighed in [his] favor."). Rather, the Board must consider the dynamic factors of prisoner
development and rehabilitation. See Rios, 2007 WL 846561, at *5. Significantly, "a murder
conviction per se should not preclude pai·ole." Id.
While the Board may give different weight to the requisite statuto1y factors, it must
consider-and rationally weigh-all of them. See King v. NY State Div. ofParole, 190 A.D .2d
423 (1st Dep't 1993), aff'd, 632 N.E.2d 1277 (N.Y. 1994); Johnson v. NY State Div. ofParole,
884 N.Y.S.2d 545 (4th Dep't 2009). The Board failed to do so here. The Boai·d focused almost
exclusively on the circumstances of M r . - instant offense and other backwai·d-looking
facts. At Mr. -

pai·ole hearing, the Commissioners intenogated him about the details

sunounding the crime for which he was convicted. They questioned Mr. -

at length

about his relationship with the victim and his whereabouts on the night before and morning of
her death. Rudofsky Aff. , Ex. G at 3-19. The remainder of the Boai·d's questions were almost

-
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entirely devoted to Mr. -

criminal histo1y, including criminal charges that were

dismissed and thus should not have been considered at all, as described more below. Id. at 1928.
The written decision, too, focused heavily on the instant offense. The Board decided
that "discretionaiy release at this time is not appropriate," stating that, if released, "there is a
reasonable probability that [Mr. -

would not live and remain at libe1ty again without

violating the law," and that "release would be incompatible with the welfare of society and
would so deprecate the serious nature of [Mr. -

crime as to llllde1mine respect for the

law." Id. at 37-38. The Board then recounted the details of Mt·. concluded that Mt·. -

instant offense, and

"criminal history reflects an escalation of criminal behavior,

which [he] continually minimize[s]." Id. The Board paid brief lip service to the other factors
required under Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A), merely noting that " [r]equired statutory factors
have been considered together with [Mt·. -

institutional assessment, including

discipline and program pa1ticipatio11, [his] risk and needs assessment and [his] need for
successful reentry into the colllIIlunity." Id. at 37. The Board also listed some facts in the record
such as Mt·. -

"participation to date and the completion of required programs," and the

"results of [his] COMPAS risk assessment and the low scores indicated therein." Id. at 38. But
it did not conduct any analysis whatsoever of any of the factors demonstrating Mt·. rehabilitation and readiness for release. Nor did it, in fact, apply the relevant evidence to the
required factors to come to a proper decision.
In sho1t, the Board gave no consideration to the fo1ward-looking chai·acteristics
mandated by Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(C)(A). See King, 190 A.D.2d at 432 ("The role of the
Pai·ole Boai·d is not to resentence petitioner according to the personal opinions of its members as
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to the appropriate penalty for murder, but to determine whether, as of this moment, given all the

relevant statutory factors, he should be released."). Its failure to do so demonstrates that the
Board gave no meaningful consideration to Mr. -

rehabilitation, strong institutional

record, or his capacity to reenter society, and thus, that it failed to take statutorily-mandated
factors into account.
Contraiy to the Boai·d's conclusions, the record is replete with evidence demonstrating
rehabilitation and suitability for release. Over more than three decades of

Mr. -

incai·ceration, Mr. -

has demonstrated his ability to take on meaningful responsibilities,

which have positively impacted the vai·ious facilities he has been at, as well as other inmates. He
has been praised for his roles as a football coach, Jewish facilitator, and gai·dener, including by
men who have since been released and remain in touch. In his role as a football coach, Mr.
-

has coached other inmates and brought together individuals who were in different

gangs so they could work together towai·ds collective success. Rudofsky Aff., Ex.Cat 5, 12, 14,
46-47. He has developed relationships with his players who have subsequently written to him,
expressing thanks for his service. Id. at 5. As an individual who is not Jewish himself, Mr.
-

also volunteered as a Jewish Facilitator, and as such, has been able to bring together

people of different faiths and serve as a mentor. Id. at 5-6, 12-13. In fact, through religious
services, Mr. -

gained an impo1tant friendship in Mr.-

been released, he and Mr. -

Although Mr.•

still speak to each other regularly, and Mr. -

expressed to the Boai·d the "great impact" and "great influence" that Mr. him. Id. at 21. Indeed, it is through Mr. upon release. Id. Finally, Mr. -

that Mr. -

has
has had on

has secured guai·anteed housing

has worked as a gardener at several facilities, including

at Bare Hill, and he has been commended for his contributions in his role. Mr. -

....

has now
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Garden Supervisor, wrote that "Mr. -

knowledge and experience in vegetable

gardening and greenhouse management was au asset to the program," and that "Mr. was timely and productive in this assignment" an d "displayed a positive an d respectful attitude
toward Staff members and inmate participants." Id. at 45. Through all of these roles, Mr.
-

has demonstrated his immense growth, maturity, and readiness to reenter society.
In addition to th e strong and positive relationships he has developed during his

imprisonment, Mr. -

institutional record reflects a virtually flawless disciplinary record

and low COMPAS score. Rudofsky Aff., Ex. B; Ex. C at 6, 11 . He has also shown that
significant support- including in guaranteed housing and employment- awaits his release. Mr.
Sylar 's aunt has offered to provide housing to Mr. Aff., Ex.Cat 21. And, Mr. -

in Rochester, New York. Rudofsky

has secured guaranteed paid employment as a Recovery

Peer Advocate with the Rochester Collllllunity Outreach and Recovery Enhancement Center,
which will offer him additional skills and training, as well as connections to other COillllllmity
agencies. Id. at 28.
The Board failed to meaningfully consider any of the above highly relevant evidence of
Mr. -

rehabilitation and growth. During the heai-ing, the Board merely listed some of

th e documents included in Mr. -

parole packet. Rudofsky Aff., Ex. G at 29:6-18, 31:5-

23, 32:14-33: 10. The Board did not, however, ask Mr. -

any questions about his positive

experiences as a football coach, Jewish Facilitator, or gardener -all of which demonstrate Mr.
-

ability to contribute to society if released. Nor did the Board ask about his

comprehensive release plan, which fmiher demonstrates his readiness for release.
Comis have granted Alticle 78 petitions where "[t]he Board sullllllarily listed
petitioner's institutional achievements, and then denied parole with no fmther analysis of them."

-
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Rossakis, 146 A.D.3d at 28. Here, the Boru·d did not even provide the "summar[y] list" held
insufficient in Rossakis: it did not address Mr . - institutional achievements at all. In its
decision, the Boru·d did not even mention Mr. -

specific accomplishments, specific

progrrun pruticipation and completions, or the contents of his release plan, despite the fact that
these were all relevant factors that the Board was required to consider under Executive Law §
259-i(2)(c)(A)(i) and § 259-i(2)(c)(A)(iii). Failing to do so rendered the Board's decision
inadequate as a matter of law. See, e.g., P fatten , 47 Misc.3d at 1064-67 (granting an Alticle 78
petition where the Board' s sole discussion of the petitioner's record while incru·cerated was
"[y]our institutional programming indicates progress and achievement which is noted to your
credit"); Coaxum v. NY. State Bd. ofParole, 14 Misc. 3d 661 , 668 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 2006)
(holding that "actual consideration of factors means more than acknowledging that evidence of
them was before the Board").
Moreover, the Board also failed to explain why Mr. -

decades-old criminal

history is more probative of his likely behavior upon release than his well-documented plan for
release. Nor did it explain why Mr. -

histo1y of past conduct outweighs his

institutional ac.complishments from the past 30 years. As detailed above, the Board's rationale
focused on Mr. -

crime of conviction, his purported decades-old histo1y of criminal

conduct, and his claim of innocence with respect to the instant offense. At bottom, the Board's
reasoning focuses on past behavior, when the relevant inquiiy involves Mr. -

present

risk to society ifreleased. Comts have held that this sort of backward-looking, iI1complete
analysis violates the Boru·d's regulations. See, e.g. , McBride, 2014 WL 815247, at *3 (granting
an Alticle 78 petition where the Board's written decision "focused only on petitioner's past
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behavior without articulating a rational basis for reaching its conclusion that his release would
be incompatible with the welfare ofsociety at this time") (emphasis added).
By failing to address these impoliant, fo1ward-looking issues, the Board violated its
governing laws and regulations.

Ill.

THE BOARD'S FAILURE TO JUSTIFY DEPARTURE FROM MR.
COMPAS SCORE VIOLATED LAWFUL PROCEDURE
The Board's conclusion that release would be incompatible with the welfare of society

and would unde1mine respect for the law directly conflicts with the results of Mr. COMPAS assessment. State law and the Board's own regulations require it to implement and
use a risk assessment tool in making parole release decisions. N.Y. Exec. Law. § 259-c(4). New
York has developed such a tool in the f01m of a COMPAS assessment. "If a Board
dete1mination, denying release, departs from the Depa11ment Risk and Needs Assessment's
scores, the Board shall specify any scale within the Department Risk and Needs Assessment
from which it depaxted and provide an individualized reason for such depaxiure." 9 NYCRR
8002.2(a).
The Boax·d failed to provide any reason for its depaxiure in Mr. any "individualized reason for such depaxiure," as required. Mr. -

case, let alone
COMPAS repo1i

cleax·ly reflects an individual who presents a low risk for future criminal behavior and who will
pose no risk to the welfax·e of society and is thus an ideal candidate for release. Rudofsky Aff. ,
Ex. B. Among other things, it scores him at a low risk for felony violence, anest, and
absconding. Id. It scores him low for criminal involvement, hist01y of violence, and prison
misconduct. Id. It scores him as being unlikely to experience negative social cognitions or low
self-efficacy upon release. Id. It scores him as unlikely to face social exclusion for financial or
employment reasons upon reentry. Id. And while it scores him as "probable" for substance
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abuse upon reentry, and "highly probable" for experiencing low family suppo1i , these scores are
e1TOneous as discussed more below. See infra Pali V.
Overall, while the B oard acknowledged Mr. -

" COMPAS risk assessment and

the low scores indicated therein, with the exception of highly probable for low family support,"
Rudofsky Aff., Ex. G at 38, it nevertheless chose to deprui from the COMPAS results without
explanation. By doing so, the Board utterly failed to draw any conclusion from the favorable
COMP AS repoli or to consider it in any meaningful way. In other words, the Board failed to
explain how it weighed Mr. offense, or how it concluded that Mr. -

COMPAS report against the circumstances of the instant
release would be " incompatible with the

welfru·e of society" in light of the repo1i. Among other things, it did not specify the pruiicular
COMP AS scales from which it was choosing to depru·t, and did not explain, in an individualized
manner, why specific aspects of Mr. -

record wa1rnnted depa1iure from these specific

scales. Rather, the Board ended its decision by stating in a concluso1y fashion: " based on all
required factors in the file considered, discretionary release at this time is not appropriate."
Rudofsky Aff., Ex. G at 38.
The Boru·d's failure to provide an individualized reason for depruiing from the COMPAS
report merits granting Mr. -

Article 78 petition . See, e.g. , Coleman v. NY State Dept.

of Corr. & C,nty. Supervision, 157 A.D.3d 672, 673 (2d Dep 't 20 18) (holding that the lower
comi should have granted the Alticle 78 petition because the Board' s findings were inational in
light of the record, which included a score of '" low' for all risk factors on [petitioner 's
COMP AS] risk assessment"). Because the Board failed to justify its departures from Mr.
-

-

low COMPAS scores, its decision must be reversed.
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IV.

THE BOARD UNLAWFULLY RESENTENCED MR.
BY
RELYING ON EVIDENCE OF DISMISSED CHARGES AND FOCUSING
EXCLUSIVELY ON BEHAVIOR THAT WAS PROPERLY BEFORE THE
SENTENCING JUDGE
In denying Mr. -

application for parole, the Board relied heavily on the details

of the crime for which he was convicted, and its conclusion that the instant offense was an
"escalation of criminal behavior" based on Mr. -

purported criminal histo1y. Rudofsky

Aff., Ex. G at 38. During the hearing, the Board explicitly questioned Mr. -

about past

criminal charges unrelated to the instant offense, all of which were dismissed. Id. at 20:9-12,
21 :12-15, 25:17-20. In paiticular, the Board asked numerous questions about unrelated 1979
charges of sexual abuse in the first degree, rape in the first degree, unlawful imprisonment and
criminal mischief; 1988 charges of rape in the third degree, two counts of endangering the
welfare of a child and six c01mts sexual abuse in the third degree; and a 1987 domestic violence
allegation. Id. It then relied on these dismissed charges in denying pai·ole. The Board e1Ted in
doing so, and its e1Tor merits granting this petition.
As shown by Mr. -

criminal record, none of the aforementioned charges or

allegations resulted in a conviction. Rudofsky Aff., Ex. A. By denying parole based on past
criminal charges that were dismissed, the Board effectively- and unlawfully-tried, convicted,
and sentenced Mr. -

for decades-old allegations. See Williams v. Travis , 20 A.D.3d 622,

623 (3d Dep 't 2005) ("Inasmuch as the criminal history explicitly relied upon by the Board as
one of the factors justifying the 48-month time assessment included chai·ges that were dismissed,
the matter must be remitted to the Board for reconsideration of the appropriate time assessment
without regard for the two dismissed charges.") (citing Kravetz v. NY. State Div. ofParole, 293
AD .2d 843 (3d Dep 't 2002)). It is well settled that the Board may not "resentence [applicants]
according to the personal opinions of its members" regarding the appropriate penalty for the

-
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applicant's offense of conviction. King, 190 A.D.2d at 432. The Board may disagree with the
decisions of law enforcement that led to the non-prosecution of Mr. -

in the 1970s and

1980s, but New York law does not pe1mit the Board to use a parole hearing in 2020 to revisit
those decisions.
Fmther, by denying Mr. that Mr. -

parole, the Board effectively made the dete1mination

judicially-imposed sentence was insufficient in light of the circumstances of

the offense. This substitution of its judgment for that of Mr. -

sentencing comt is

reversible etTor. The Board based its decision solely on factors that existed at the time of
sentencing, which the sentencing comt duly considered. See Rudofsky Aff., Ex.Kat 5-8. By
denying parole based on these factors, the Board imposed a longer sentence than the minimum
sentence imposed by the sentencing court, thereby effectively resentencing Mr. -

to a

higher minimum sentence. That a petitioner was convicted of murder, however, is not sufficient
grounds to deny release, paiticularly where a sentencing comi has already dete1mined the
sufficient minimum sentence for the offense. "Certainly every murder conviction is inherently a
matter of the utmost seriousness since it reflects the unjustifiable taking and tragic loss of a
humai1 life. Since, however, the Legislature has detennined that a murder conviction per se
should not preclude parole, there must be a showing of some aggravating circumstances beyond
the inherent seriousness of the crime itself." King, 190 A.D.2d at 433 . The Board has pointed to
no such aggravating circumstances here. fudeed, in the Board's June 10, 2021 decision
affnming its denial, it merely states that " [a]ggravating factors do exist," without explaining that
finding at all or listing a single aggravating factor. Rudofsky Aff., Ex. I at 3. The Board's
dete1mination that it is better suited to judge Mr. -

then-culpability based on

info1mation that was available to the sentencing comi "reveal[s] a fundamental misunderstanding

....
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of the limitations of administrative power." Rios, 2007 WL 846561, at *4 (citing King, 190
A.D.2d at 432). The Board's decision should be reversed on this ground.
Because the Boru·d effectively resentenced Mr. -

to a higher minirmun sentence,

reversal is necessary.

V.

THE BOARD UNLAWFULLY RELIED ON INACCURATE ASSESSMENTS
AND INFORMATION
The Boru·d's reliance on a record that contained several pieces of inaccurate infonnation

also wrurnnts reversal. In pruticulru·, the Board apperu·s to have relied on iriaccurate assessments
in Mr. -

othe1wise favorable COM.PAS repo1i concerning his risk of substru1ce abuse

and low family suppo1i. Fir·st~ the COM.PAS repo1t's score of "probable" for the risk of
substance abuse upon reentry, Rudofsky Aff., Ex. Bat 1, is entirely unsupported by any facts and
is, indeed, contradicted by the documents in the record. The record shows that in 2016, the
Treatment Plan Review Committee assessed Mr. -

and found that he did not require

Alcohol and Substance Abuse Treatment (ASAT) because "no evidence suggest[s} a clinical

diagnosis for a substance use disorder." Rudofsky Aff., Ex.Cat 58 (emphasis added).
Sirnilru·ly, in his prior COM.PAS repo1ts dated September 15, 2016 and July 27, 2018, Mr.
-

was given the lowest score of 1 for risk of substance abuse upon reentry because,

among other things, he did not undergo "any prior treatments for mug/alcohol abuse and did not
indicate any history of failed diug/UA tests." Rudofsky Aff., Ex. D at 1; Ex.Eat 1, 4. And in
his case plans from May 2018 through November 2019, Mr. -

counselors consistently

indicated that he had no need for a substance abuse progrrun. Rudofsky Aff., Ex.Fat 3, 6, 12,
17, 22. Given that Mr. -

has not incun-ed any disciplina1y infractions related to diug use,

nor tested positive for any di11gs since the 2016, 2018, and 2019 case plans and reports, there is
simply no evidence to suggest that Mr. -

-

has~r ever has had- any substance abuse
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issues that would waITant a "probable" rating on this risk factor. As Mr. -

stated at the

parole hearing, "I don't have a problem with drngs, sir. I hate them. I hate them." Rudofsky Aff.,

Mr.-

Ex. G at 34:20-21. The Boru·d appru·ently agreed, id. at 34:22-24, but neve1theless failed to
cleru·ly and expressly acknowledge that the COMPAS repo1t's assessment of

risk

of substance abuse upon reentry was eIToneous.
Second, the COMPAS report's score of "highly probable" for low family support- a
rating the BoaTd reiterated in its decision- is contradicted by evidence in Mr. -

file.

At the time, this score was based on the assessor's comment that although Mr. "indicated that he believes that other relatives are suppo1tive ... [i]t is unce1t ain as to whether
there is evidence of family suppo1t." Rudofsky Aff., Ex. B at 11. But Mr. -

cousin

submitted a suppoit letter dated August 2020- after the COMPAS report was
prepared- stating that he "want[s] to suppolt [Mr. -

emotionally however [he] can."

Rudofsky Aff., Ex.Cat 18. This letter was before the Boru·d and unde1mines the COMPAS
report's finding in this regard. Indeed, because Mr.-

s letter demonstrates that Mr.

has family suppo1t, the COMPAS repo1t is enoneous in giving him a "highly

probable" score for low family suppo1t. At the hearing, the Board noted Mr. -

letter and

asked Mr. -

about his children, who live a thousand miles away in Florida. But whether

or not Mr. -

is in regular contact with his children does not unde1mine the fact that he

has the suppo1t of family members such as Mr.-

which wa1Tants a lower risk score than

"highly probable" with respect to low family suppo1t
The Boru·d should not have relied on these inaccurate assessments, which are contradicted
by other facts in the record, and its doing so merits vacatur. See Lewis v. Travis, 9 A.D.3d 800,
801 (3d Dep't 2004) ("Inasmuch as the Board relied on inconect inf01mation in denying

-1923 of 27

FUSL000149

petitioner's request for parole release, the judgment must be reversed and a new hearing
granted."). 1
Fmther, the Board eIToneously found that Mr. -

failed to show any remorse-and

could not show any remorse-because he maintains his innocence with respect to the U11derlying
offense. In its decision, the Board stated, "You continued to claim innocence in the instant
offense and, therefore, there could have been no remorse for the crime for which you were
convicted and the family involved." Rudofsky Aff., Ex. G at 38. But the parole hearing
trauscript belies this finding, and the Board's reliance on it constitutes reversable error. At the
hearing, Iv.Ir. -

expressed deep remorse and empathy. He explained that, while he

maintains his innocence for the instant crime, he nonetheless thinks about the victim's family all
the time, including her mother and son for whom he has great empathy. Id. at 36:4-11 . In fact,
the Board acknowledged that Mr. -

got "ve1y emotional" when speaking about the

victim's family. Id. at 36:13-14. And although he does- and always has- maintained his
im1ocence for the instant offense, Mr. -

also admitted that he is not proud of his past or

the person he was over 30 yearn ago, expressing remorse and soITow for ce1tain actions he took
back then. Id. at 35:4-36:4.
Where an applicant shows insight and remorse for the victim and the victim's family, as
here, the Board cannot base its decision on a lack ofremorse. See Winchell v. Evans, 2010 WL
2293190 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cnty. 2010) (finding that the Board's denial, which was based on the

1

The Board is also wrong that Mr. "waiv[ed] the matter" by failing to raise the eITors contained in his
COMPAS report at his hearing. See Rudofsky Aff., Ex. I at 5. Contrary to the Board's asse1iion, Mr.did
indeed raise these en-ors at the hearing. Upon being asked whether there was "anything that [he] want[ ed] to share
with [the Board]" that they had not yet discussed, Mr. illllllediately responded that he wanted to talk about
"the dmg thing" from his COMP AS report. Rudofsky Aff., Ex. G at 34:4-9. He explained that he does not "have a
problem with dmgs," which the Board acknowledged to be true. Id. at 34:8-35:2. The Board did not, however,
clearly or expressly state--either at the hearing or in its decision-that it would not consider this incon-ect
assessment And as to the en-oneous family suppoti score, Mr. likewise discussed that issue at the hearing,
including by responding to the Board's questions about his children, who live far away in Florida. Id. at 29:18-31 :4.
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petitioner failing to show remorse for the victim or her family and not appearing to understand
the seriousness of his crime, was contradicted by the record). Here, the Board apparently
concluded that Mr. -

is incapable of feeling remorse because he maintains his innocence.

But the mere fact that Mr. -

continues to maintain his innocence for the instant offense-

because he asse1ts he did not commit it- should not bar him from parole indefinitely,
pa1ticularly when he expressed that he feels sony for what happened to the victim and her
family. Indeed, none of Mr. -

prior parole denial decisions indicate that he lacked

remorse for the instant offense and for the victim's family, despite the fact that he maintained his
innocence during each of those hearings as well. Rudofsky Aff., Ex. J.
The Board relied on inaccurate assessments in the record and, separately, erroneously
concluded that Mr. -

could not express remorse. These e1rnrs further suppo1t granting

the instant petition.

VI.

THE BOARD ILLEGALLY DISREGARDED MR.
PLAN

REENTRY

The Board' s governing statute explicitly requires the Board to consider "release plans
including community resources, employment, education and training and suppo1t se1vices
available to the inmate" in making a release decision. N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(c)(A)(iii). But
here, the Board failed to meaningfully consider Mr. -

reentry plan in rendering its

decision. Since the Board failed to consider a statutorily-required factor, the denial was arbitraiy
and capricious and must be vacated.
Mr. -

application for pai·ole included a comprehensive reentiy plan, including a

plan for housing and employment if released, documented suppoit from friends and fainily
members, and six letters of reasonable assurance. Despite this extensive written record, it
appeai·s that the Board failed to consider Mr. -

-

reentiy plan at all. As detailed above,
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the Board focused almost exclusively on the seriousness of the crime of conviction during the
hearing, and failed to ask Mr. -

any questions about his readiness for release. Moreover,

the Board's written decision merely states-in its final paragraph-that it had "reviewed and
considered" Mr. -

"well-documented release plan." Rudofsky Aff. , Ex. G at 38. Yet

the Board did not mention a single aspect of Nlr. -

release plan.

Because the Board failed to give meaningful consideration to a factor it is statutorily
required to consider, its decision was arbitrary and capricious. See Mayfield v. Evans, 93 A.D.3d
98, 110 (1st Dep't 2012) (" [T]he absence of a detailed decision inappropriately foreclosed the
possibility of intelligent review of the Parnle Board member's reasons."); Coaxum, 14 Misc. 3d
at 668 (holding that "actual consideration of factors means more than acknowledging that
evidence of them was before the Board"). fudeed, comts have granted Alticle 78 petitions
seeking review of Board decisions that fail to consider all of the statuto1y parole factors. See,

e.g., Mitchell, 58 A.D.3d at 743. Fmiher, courts have held that, when the Board fails to consider
all relevant statutory factors, as it did in Mr. -

case, it is "a strong indication that the

denial of petitioner's application was a foregone conclusion." Johnson, 65 A .D.3d at 839 (citing

King, 190 A.D .2d at 431-32). When the Board prejudges an applicant's case, as it did here,
vacatur is necessaiy. King, 190 A.D.2d at 434.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court enter an order:
1. Annulling the decision of Respondent, dated September 29, 2020, denying
Petitioner- - parole release; and
2. Directing Respondent to immediately release Petitioner on pai·ole or afford Mr.
-

a new, de novo parole release heai·ing before a new panel that does not

include any commissioner who has previously denied Mr. -

-

-2226 of 27

release, at

FUSL000149

which Respondent shall consider all appropriate statut01y factors governing
parole release dete1minations; and
3. Granting such additional relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Dated: October 8, 2021
New York, New York
By:

al-Joshua Goldberg
Ariel Rudofsky
Attorneys for Petitioner
PATTERSON BELKNAP WEBB &
TYLERLLP
113 3 A venue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036
Tel.: 212-336-2000
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